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Banksleverage behaviour
in a two-agent New Keynesian model
Andrea Boitani and Chiara Punzo 
December 2017
Abstract
In a NK model with two types of rational agents, savers and capitalists, and non-
maximizing banks, nancial shocks do a¤ect the macroeconomic dynamics depending
on banksbehaviour as for their leverage ratio. We rst show that the level of banks
leverage - which may be imposed by banks regulation - a¤ects the steady state level
of output, employment and consumption, as might be expected in a non-Modigliani-
Miller world. Di¤erent banks behaviour after a shock has widely di¤erent e¤ects
on the macroeconomic dynamics: passive leverage results to be shock absorbing and
capable of neutralizing an initial nancial shock, whilst procyclical behaviour implies
higher and more persistent instability and distributive e¤ects than the constant lever-
age behaviour. Finally, we show that the interaction of procyclical leverage with
hysteresis in output and employment stregthens the persistence of nancial shocks.
JEL: E32; E44; E70; G01.
Keywords: Leverage, Procyclicality; Two-agent model; Non-maximising banks.
1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2007 nancial crisis, the high level of leverage of nancial interme-
diaries has commonly been identied as the main weakness of ailing advanced economies
and, consequently, as one of the major causes of the crisis (Financial Stability Forum,
2009). Many observers pointed at leverage procyclicality i.e. the increase (decrease) of
leverage following an increase (decrease) of total assets value - as an amplication mech-
anism of business cycles upturns and downturns (Adrian and Shin, 2010), despite the
presence of mildly stabilizing monetary policy. The procyclicality of leverage may indeed
fuel a supply side nancial accelerator complementing (or substituting for) the demand
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side nancial accelerator pioneered by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997) in explaining business cycles booms and recessions. During upturns asset
prices rise and - for a given value of debt - banksleverage goes down. However, if banks
target their leverage, the purchase of new assets will be nanced by issuing new debt
(deposits) in order to restore the targeted leverage. Such a mechanism may also work
in the reverse, whenever there is a negative shock to asset prices. The nancial-induced
propagation mechanism of exogenous shocks may even become self-enforcing if banks let
their leverage be procyclical, which happens (for instance) if banks target their capital to
a xed proportion of their Value at Risk (VaR)1.
Despite the relevance for policy-making, most workhorse general equilibrium models
routinely employed in research and policy institutions lack a suitable interaction between
banks leverage behaviour and the rest of the economy. Some work has been done to
address the dynamic impact of di¤erent macroprudential policies regarding capital and/or
leverage requirements (La Croce and Rossi 2014). In the present paper we explicitly model
di¤erent banksreactions to shocks hitting the real price of their assets in an upswing or
in a downswing of the nancial cycle, in order to explore the ensuing macroeconomic
dynamics. In other words banks are allowed to either strictly abide by the regulatory
requirements (that is target the prescribed leverage ratio) or to be pro-cyclical as they
actually were in the last two decades both in Europe and the US.
The paper thus contributes to the literature on the role of nancial factors in business
cycle uctuations, by at once bringing together and grafting some real worldbehavioural
features in a NK model. The NK literature has focused on the comparison between
shocks originating in the banking sector and macroeconomic shocks (Gerali et al. (2010)),
particularly stressing the substantial impact of an unexpected reduction in bank capital on
the real economy. However, Gerali et al. (2010) abstracts from the role played by banks
leverage behaviour. Furthermore, as most of the papers comprising a banking sector2.
Gerali et al. (2010) di¤erentiates between patient households and impatient ones3, and
it does not analyze the interaction between two main characters which turn around the
banking world: savers and capitalists. This paper moves a step forward, by considering a
1The empirical evidence on banks procyclical behaviour is large. See, among many others, Adrian T.,
Shin H.S. (2010); Baglioni A., Beccalli E., Boitani A., Monticini A. (2013) ; Beccalli E., Boitani A., Di
Giuliantonio S. (2015).
2Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Iacoviello (2005) pioneered the introduction of credit and
collateral requirements into macroeonomic models in order to study how shocks are transmitted or amplied
in the presence of nancial variables. These model assume that credit transactions take place through the
market and do not assign any role to nancial intermediaries such as banks.
3This setup has become increasingly popular in the recent literature. Mankiw (2000) analyses the
classic savers-spenders model of scal policy in which myopic household, who merely consume their
income, co-exist with standard, intertemporally optimising households. The classic savers-spenders model
has been extended by, among others, Galì et al. (2007) and Bilbiie (2008) to include nominal rigidities
and other frictions to study questions ranging from the e¤ects of government spending to monetary policy
analysis and equilibrium determinacy. See for instance Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) and Monacelli
and Perotti (2012). These models are variants of the RBC-type borrower-saver framework proposed in for
example, Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and extended to a New Keynesian environment by Iacoviello (2005)
and Monacelli (2010); for an early analysis see Becker (1980) and Becker and Foias (1987). See also Bilbiie,
Monacelli and Perotti (2013).
2
New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model - henceforth, NK-DSGE
model - characterized (i) by two types of agents (savers and capitalists) who interact in
the credit market, (ii) non neutral monetary policy by assumption (Ravenna and Walsh,
2006) and (iii) the possibility of unemployment, due to labour market frictions such as
the existence of hiring costs (Blanchard and Galí, 2010; Abbritti, Boitani and Damiani,
2012).
Savers and capitalists di¤er in their risk aversion, and both agents are intertemporal
maximizers. However, in our model savers do not hold shares but supply savings to
banks (i.e. savings take the form of deposits), while capitalists hold both bank and rm
shares. Banksassets are loans to rms and bonds issued by rms (owned by capitalists).
Banks are modeled as representative non-maximising agents who want to keep a xed
proportion between loans and bonds in the asset side of their balance sheet. Three possible
behavioural rules in response to an exogenous decrease in the real value of bonds are
examined. All these rules fulll the steady state constant proportionality of banksassets.
The rules are as follows: (i) the bank accepts whatever leverage ratio is determined by
the interplay of an initial shock and the aggregate dynamics (passive leverage); (ii) the
bank follows a target leverage ratio (in our model the bank is assumed to target the
macroprudential leverage level); (iii) the bank follows a procyclical behaviour according
to which assets vary proportionally in response to a change in banks prot. In case (i)
and (iii) the bank returns to the regulated leverage level only in the long run.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. As may be expected,
the non-Modigliani-Miller world assumed in our model delivers a steady state equilibrium
of the economy which is inuenced by the level of banksleverage. We nd that higher
leverage implies higher steady-state values of output and employment. As the leverage
level is a macro-prudential policy instrument, our model tells us that macro-prudential
policy is non neutral in a steady state. Another key nding emerges as we compare the
above-mentioned di¤erent banks leverage behaviours. If banks are passive with respect
to leverage, the nancial shock is entirely absorbed by a change in banksequity and is
not transmitted to real variables such as employment and output. The model conrms
the intuition that the banks procyclical behaviour after a shock implies a higher and
more persistent instability e¤ect than the constant leverage behaviour. The procyclicality
of banksbehaviour tends to amplify the e¤ects of the shock on real variables. The two
agents framework allows us to also address distributive issues. A negative shock to the real
value of bonds, despite an initial short-lived distributive e¤ect from capitalists to savers,
has a persistent and large distributive e¤ect in the opposite direction - i.e. from savers to
capitalists. Positive shocks have opposite and symmetric e¤ects.
In order to explore the interaction between di¤erent real worldfeatures, we compare
a model characterized by constant productivity with the same model under hysteresis.
Empirical studies support the hysteresis hypothesis that recessions have permanent e¤ects
on the level of output4. We analyze the implications of hysteresis in a DSGE model in
the presence of a shock to the real value of rmsbonds. Following Engler and Tervala
(2016), we assume a simple learning-by-doing mechanism where demand-driven changes
4See Ball (2014); Blanchard et al. (2015), Fatas and Summers (2016)
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in employment can permanently a¤ect the level of productivity, leading to hysteresis in
output. We show that, with hysteresis, the e¤ect of the shock on real variables is more
persistent. The proposed model allow us to capture two relevant features of contempor-
ary economies: uctuations in employment and unemployment and distributional e¤ects
ensuing from di¤erent patterns of banksbehaviour. The DSGE framework adopted does
not allow one to mimic the sort of nancial instability hypothesisadvanced by Hyman
Minsky (1992): the economy displays dynamic stability, i.e. it goes back to a steady state
sometimes after a nancial shock. However shock amplication due to leverage targeting
and procyclical leverage is at work. The model suggests that even a constant leverage
regulatory requirement is not su¢ cient to fully stabilise the economy and prevent dis-
tributive e¤ects between savers and capitalists. Full stabilisation in our model-economy
is only achieved when banks have a de facto anti-cyclical leverage such as the passive
leverage behaviour simulated in Section 3.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 spells out the model
economy, while Section 3 analyses the e¤ects of a shock to the real value of rmsbonds in
our NK model with savers, capitalists and non-maximising banks. It compares the results
obtained under two di¤erent banks leverage behaviours, and then it compares results
under banksprocyclical leverage in the absence and in the presence of hysteresis. Section
4 summarizes the main ndings and concludes.
2 The model
This section outlines our economic environment, which consists of two types of households,
savers and capitalists, both deriving utility from consumption goods and leisure. Further-
more, we consider a New-Keynesian model with imperfectly competitive goods markets
and sticky prices. We follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and consider a closed pro-
duction economy populated by a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers.
Each rm produces a di¤erentiated good by using as an input the labour services supplied
by households. We capture labour market frictions through hiring costs increasing in la-
bour market tightness, dened as the ratio of hires to the unemployment pool (Blanchard
and Galì, 2010; Abbritti, Boitani and Damiani, 2012).The prices of consumption goods are
assumed to be sticky à la Rotemberg (1982). Following De Grauwe, Macchiarelli (2015),
banks are implicitly included in this model, since the interest rate is the price of credit.
However, in order to account for banks explicitly, we introduce non-maximising banks,
which are assumed to collect deposits from savers and lend to capitalists (rms), besides
holding bonds issued by rms.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households [0,1] indexed by j, all having the same utility function:
U(Cj;t; Nj;t) =
C
1 j
j;t
1  j  
N1+'j;t
1 + '
;
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where ' > 0 is the inverse of the labour supply elasticity. The agents di¤er in their risk
aversion coe¢ cient j . Specically, we assume that there are two types of agents, j = s; c,
s > c:
All households (regardless of their discount factor) consume an aggregate basket of indi-
vidual goods k 2 [0; 1], with constant elasticity of substitution ": Ct =
hR 1
0 Ct (k)
" 1
" dk
i "
" 1
,
" > 1: Standard demand theory implies that total demand for each good is Ct (k) =h
Pt(k)
Pt
i "
Ct, where Ct (k) is total demand of good k;
Pt(k)
Pt
its relative price and Ct ag-
gregate consumption.5 The aggregate price index is P 1 "t =
R 1
0 Pt (k)
1 " dk:
A share (1   ) of households are less risk-averse. Consistent with the equilibrium
outcome (discussed below) that less risk-averse agents are actually capitalists, we impose
that less risk-averse agents also hold all the shares of rms and banks. They could also be
labeled as capitalists(indexed by c).
Each capitalist chooses consumption, hours worked and shareholdings (of banks and
rms), solving the standard intertemporal problem:
maxEt
" 1X
i=0
U (Cc;t+i; Nc;t+i)
#
;
subject to the sequence of constraints:
Cc;t + 

f
c;tV
f
t + 

b
c;tV
b
t  
fc;t 1

V ft +  
f
t

+ 
bc;t 1

V bt +  
b
t

+ wtNc;t (1)
where Et is the expectations operator, Cc;t; Nc;t are consumption and hours worked by
risk-taker agent, wt is the real wage. V
f
t is the real market value at time t of shares of
rms,  ft are real dividend payo¤s of these share and 

f
c;t are rmsshareholdings. V
b
t is
the real market value at time t of shares in banks,  bt are real dividend payo¤s of these
shares and 
bc;t are banksshareholdings.
The Euler equations - for rms shareholdings and bank shareholdings - and the in-
tratemporal optimality condition are as follows:
V ft = Et

Cc;t
Cc;t+1
c 
V ft+1 +  
f
t+1

(2)
V bt = Et

Cc;t
Cc;t+1
c 
V bt+1 +  
b
t+1

;
N'c;tCc;t = Wt: (3)
The rest of the household on the [0; ] interval are more risk-averse (and will save in
equilibrium, hence we index them by s for savers). They face the intertemporal constraint:
Cs;t +Ds;t  1 + it 1
t
Ds;t 1 + wtNs;t: (4)
5This equation holds in aggregate because the same static problem is solved by both types of households.
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The Euler equation for deposits, Ds;t, is as follows:
C ss;t = 

1 + it
t+1

C ss;t+1 (5)
and the deviation of saverslabour supply, Ns;t, from its steady state value, Ns; depends
on the deviation of the labour demand, Nt, from its steady state value, N . Savers labour
supply matches demand. Hence:
Ns;t  Ns = Nt  N: (6)
2.2 Firms
There are innitely many rms indexed by k on the unit interval [0; 1], and each of them
produces a di¤erentiated variety of goods with a constant return to scale technology:
Yt (k) = ztNt (k) (7)
where Nt (k) denotes the quantity of labour hired by rm k in period t and zt represents
the state of technology which is assumed to be common across rms. Employment in rm
k evolves according to:
Nt (k) = (1  )Nt 1 (k) +Ht (k) ; (8)
where  2 (0; 1) is an exogenous separation rate, and Ht (k) represents the measure of
workers hired by rm k in period t: Note that new hires start working in the period they
are hired. At the beginning of period t there is a pool of jobless available for hire, and
whose size we denote by Ut: We refer to the latter variable as beginning-of-period unem-
ployment (or just unemployment, for short). We make assumptions below that guarantee
full participation, i.e., at all times all individuals are either employed or willing to work,
given the prevailing labour market conditions. Accordingly, we have:
Ut = 1 Nt 1 + Nt 1 = 1  (1  )Nt 1; (9)
where Nt 
R 1
0 Nt (k) dk denotes aggregate employment. We introduce an index of labour
market tightness, tt;which we dene as the ratio of aggregate hires to unemployment:
tt  Ht
Ut
: (10)
This tightness index tt will play a central role in what follows. It is assumed to lie
within the interval [0; 1]. Only agents in the unemployment pool at the beginning of the
period can be hired (Ht  Ut). In addition and given positive hires in the steady state,
shocks are assumed to be small enough to guarantee that desired hires remain positive at all
times. Note that, from the viewpoint of the unemployed, the index tt has an alternative
interpretation. It is the probability of being hired in period t, or, in other words, the
job nding rate. Below we use the terms labour market tightness and job nding rate
interchangeably. Hiring labour is costly. The cost of hiring for an individual rm is given
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by gtHt (k), expressed in terms of the CES bundle of goods. gt represents the marginal
cost per hire, which is independent of Ht (k) and taken as given by each individual rm.
While gt is taken as given by each rm, it is an increasing function of labour market
tightness. Formally, we assume:
gt = ztKtt; (11)
where K is a positive constant. The relevance of gt in our model economy is strictly
related to the extensive margin hypothesis: each rm may adjust its optimal amount of
labour by recruiting additional workers and thus paying the hiring cost; the relevance of
hiring costs emerges even in more general models, where extensive margin adjustments
are accompanied by intensive margin adjustments, provided the rst kind of adjustment
does not play a trivial role. Firms may bear advertising, screening, and training costs and
may incur in ring costs when protection legislation imposes legal restrictions. Vacancies
are assumed to be lled immediately by paying the hiring cost, which is a function of
labour market tightness. For future reference, let us dene an alternative measure of
unemployment, denoted by ut; and given by the fraction of the population who are left
without a job after hiring takes place in period t. Formally, and given our assumption of
full participation, we have:
ut = Ut  Ht = 1 Nt: (12)
Following Rotemberg (1982), we assume that rms face quadratic adjustment costs:

2

Pt (k)
Pt 1 (k)
  1
2
expressed in the units of the consumption good and   0:The benchmark of exible prices
can easily be recovered by setting the parameter  = 0. The present value of current and
future prots reads as:
Et
( 1X
i=0
Qt;t+i
"
Pt+i (k)Yt+i (k) + Pt+iL
d
t (k) + Pt+iB
s
t (k) Wt+iNt+i (k)
 1+t 1t Ldt 1 (k) 
1+it 1
t
Bst 1 (k)  Pt+i 2

Pt+i(k)
Pt+i 1(k)   1
 #) ;
whereQt;t+i is the discount factor in period t for nominal prots i periods ahead. Assuming
that rms discount at the same rate as capitalists  (Qt;t+i = 

Cc;t
Cc;t+1
c
), which is
assumed to be strictly lower than s, implies that entrepreneurs are, in equilibrium, net
borrowers. Each rm faces the following demand function:
Yt (k) =

Pt (k)
Pt
 "
Y dt ;
where Y dt is aggregate demand and it is taken as given by any rm k. Firms choose pro-
cesses prices Pt (k) ; the desired amount of labour input Nt (k) ; loans demand Ldt and bond
supply Bst0 so as to maximise nominal prots subject to the production function and the
demand function, while taking as given aggregate prices and quantities

Pt;Wt; Y
d
t
	
t0 :
Let the real marginal cost be denoted by:
mct =
(1 + t) (wt + gt)
zt
(13)
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Notice that, as in Ravenna and Walsh (2006), real marginal costs depend directly
on the nominal interest rate. This introduces the so called cost channel of monetary
transmission into the model. If rms costs for external funds rise with the short-run
nominal interest rate, then monetary policy cannot be neutral, even in the presence of
exible prices and exible interest rates. We assume that the amount of bond supply that
banks are willing to buy from entrepreneurs is constrained by the value of their collateral,
exogenously xed. The bond supply constraint is thus:
Bst  Bs (14)
The assumption on the discount factor  and of small uncertaintyallows us to solve
the model by imposing an always binding bond supply constraint for the entrepreneurs.
Then, at a symmetric equilibrium where Pt (k) = Pt and Nt (k) = Nt for all k 2 [0; 1],
prot maximisation and the denition of the discount factor imply that:
t(t   1) = Et

Cc;t
Cc;t+1
c
2t+1(t+1   1)

+
ztNt


mct     1


(15)
which is the standard Phillips curve according to which current ination depends positively
on expected future ination and current marginal cost.
The aggregate f.o.c across rms with respect to the supply of bonds reads as:
1 + it =
1

Et

t+1

Cc;t+1
Cc;t
c
[1 + t] (16)
This condition, together with (1) and (18), implicitly denes a supply of bonds function
such as:
Bs = f(it; Cc;t+1; Cc;t; t; t)
where f 0it > 0; i.e. the supply of bonds is positively related to the policy rate of interest,
all else being equal. In addition, the constraint on bond supply t depends positively on
the policy rate and takes a positive value whenever the constraint is binding. Indeed,
because of our assumption on the relative size of the discount factors, the bond supply
constraint will always bind in steady state. The aggregate f.o.c. across rms with respect
to the demand for loans is:
1 + t =
1

Et

t+1

Cc;t+1
Cc;t
c
(17)
which, once again together with (1) and the (18) implicitly denes a loan demand function
such as:
LD = b(t; Cc;t+1; Cc;t; t)
where b0t < 0; i.e. the demand for loans is a decreasing function of the interest rate on
loans, all else being equal.
The rm prot function in real terms is given by:
 ft = Yt + L
d
t +B
s
t   wtNt   gtHt  
1 + t 1
t
Ldt 1  
1 + it 1
t
Bst 1  

2
(t   1)2 (18)
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2.3 Banks and monetary authority
Banks play a central role in our model since they intermediate all nancial transactions
between agents in the model. The only saving instrument available to risk-averse house-
holds is bank deposits. Entrepreneurs may borrow either by applying for a bank loan or
by selling its bonds to a bank.
We shall assume non-maximising identical banks in order to explore di¤erent behavi-
oural patterns6. The rst key ingredient in our simple banks modeling strategy is that
they obey a balance sheet identity:
Bdt + L
s
t = Dt + E
b
t (19)
stating that banks can nance their bond holdings Bdt and their loans supply L
s
t using
either deposits Dt or bank equity Ebt : For a commercial bank, the leverage is thus the ratio
between its assets and equity.
1

=
Lst +B
d
t
Bdt + L
s
t  Dt
(20)
When a rm borrows money from a bank, it must pay an interest which normally exceeds
the interest rates that savers receive for deposits. Hence, the cost of a loan from banks,
, is usually equal to the rate savers receive (here equal to the risk-free rate set by the
central bank, i) plus a spread, x:
t = it + xt: (21)
The next step in the analysis is to determine what the spread between the borrowing
and the deposit rate is. The aggregate real prots of banks are:
 bt = Dt   Lst  Bdt +
1 + t 1
t
Lst 1 +
1 + it 1
t
Bdt 1  
1 + it 1
t
Dt 1: (22)
As for the monetary authority we shall assume the Central Bank sticks to a pure
ination targeting rule, i.e. it sets the nominal interest rate in response to uctuations in
ination (we assume for simplicity that target ination is one)7:
log
1 + it
1 + i
=  log
t

(23)
2.4 Aggregation and market clearing
In an equilibrium of this economy, all agents take as given the evolution of exogenous
processes. A rational expectations equilibrium is then as usually a sequence of processes
for all prices and quantities introduced above such that the optimality conditions hold for
6At this stage of our analysis it is not relevant distinguishing between commercial and investment banks.
7The introduction of more complex Taylor rules, comprising some macroprudential targets, is on the
research agenda.
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all agents and all markets clear at any given time t. Specically, labour market clearing
requires that labour demand equals total labour supply:
Nt = Ns;t + (1  )Nc;t: (24)
Equity market clearing implies that rmsshare holdings of each capitalist are:

fc;t = 

f
c;t 1 =
1
1  ; (25)
and banks share holdings of each capitalist are:

bc;t = 

b
c;t 1 =
1
1  : (26)
Finally, by WalrasLaw the goods market also clears. The aggregate resource con-
straint species that produced output will be consumed or, if saved, will nance the cost
of hiring (for a proof see the Appendix):
Yt = Ct + gtHt +

2
(t   1)2 ; (27)
where
Ct = Cs;t + (1  )Cc;t (28)
is aggregate consumption. All loans issued by the banks will be demanded by rms.
Market clearing for loans implies:
Ldt = L
s
t : (29)
Finally, all bonds issued by the rms will be demanded by banks. Market clearing for
bonds implies:
Bdt = B
s
t : (30)
2.5 Steady State
We focus on a deterministic steady state where ination is one, i.e. at the Central Bank
target. To simplify the analysis, we make the further assumption that savers supply a
xed amount of labour in steady state: Ns = 1: This assumption is consistent with the
view of a constant employment for risk-averse households, as well as a consumption level
proportional to the real wage (Galì, Lòpez-Salido and Vallés, 2004).
In the steady state the leverage ratio is assumed to be equal to 1 . The values of the
macroeconomic variables of interest are reported in the third and fourth column of Table
(1) If  = 0:09, which is consistent with the Basilea 3 requirement (Gerali et al., 2010),
output and aggregate consumption are larger and the distribution (as measured by the
ratio of capitalists consumption to savers consumption) is skewed towards savers. That is
the level of banks leverage inuences the steady state equilibrium of the model economy
and that higher leverage implies higher steady-state values of output and a lower rate of
10
Variable Symbol Value of 
 = 0:03  = 0:09
Invest. Cons. Cc 2.7738 2.9795
Saver Cons. Cs 0.7689 0.7450
Aggr. Cons. C 0.9694 0.9684
Output Y 0.9766 0.9756
Table 1: Steady State
inequality. This is not surprising: in a non-Modigliani-Miller world - i.e. a world with
nancial hierarchy - the steady state value of output depends on the spread between the
interest rate on loans and the risk free interest rate. Such a spread is inuenced by the
level of banksleverage. As the steady state leverage ratio is chosen by the regulator we
nd that banks regulators a¤ect directly the steady state level of output and employment.
However, higher leverage of banks also adds to the instability of the economy, i.e. when
banks have a higher leverage a nancial shock (to the real value of bonds) has a larger
impact on real variables and for a longer time, as we shall show in the following section.
2.6 Banks leverage rules
In normaltimes bondsvalue is assumed to be constant and equal to Bs: The objective
of the analysis below is to determine the consequences of a negative bondsvalue shock8.
Below we assume that such a shock follows the exogenous process:
Bst = B
s + ubt ;
where:
ubt = bu
b
t 1   "bt ;
and b 2 [0; 1) is a measure of the persistence of the shock.
We consider three di¤erent banks leverage behavioural rules. We assume that all rules
fulll a common condition: the dynamics of loans supply follows the exogenous dynamics
of bond supply, taking account of the equilibrium in the bonds market:
Bdt
Lst
=
Bd
Ls
: (31)
We label this condition as constant assets proportion (CAP). The three behavioural rules
are as follows:
1. The bank accommodates whatever leverage ratio is determined by the shock (provided
the CAP condition (31) is fullled) and by the macroeconomic dynamic adjustment
towards the steady state. Deposits are kept constant and the shock is absorbed by
an increase in the banks equity.
8A symmetric analysis can be carried out as for positive shocks.
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2. The bank has a target leverage ratio and keeps constant the SS proportionality
of assets. Thus, while the dynamic of loans supply continues to be explained by
(31), the dynamic of deposits follows the constant leverage rule (hereafter, constant
leverage).
Bdt + L
s
t
Ebt
=
1

Under this behavioural rule banks continuously fulll the regulatory requirements
concerning leverage. That is banks stick to the steady state leverage ratio, adjusting
loans and deposits to accommodate whatever shock to the real value of their bond
holdings.
3. The bank follows a procyclical behaviour according to which future assets, At; vary
in response to an increase of banks prot. From equation (22) it is apparent that
a change in a banks prot is equivalent to a change in its equity, and a change in
equity, given deposits and loans may only be due to a change in bonds. Therefore, a
shock to the real value of bonds is equivalent to a change in prots. After a negative
shock to the real price of bonds the value of total assets decreases (equity decreases)
and the Value at Risk of the bank increases sharply and its insolvency becomes more
likely (Adrian, Shin, 2010). If the bank targets its capital ratio to its VaR, a decline
in VaR pushes the bank to deleveraging by selling assets (and reducing debts) until
the desired VaR has been restored. This behaviour can be captured by the simple
procyclical leverage rule (hereafter, procyclical leverage):
At+1 =  
b
t :
together with (31).
Notice that in our model even a procyclical leverage is not allowed to be explosive
(either permanently increasing or permanently decreasing). The model has a strong
built-in stabilization mechanism such that banksprocyclical leverage will not be
monotonic and will actually slowly converge back to its steady state regulatory level.
3 Model Dynamics
3.1 Calibration
Before we start showing our results, we briey show the baseline calibration of the models
parameters. That calibration is summarized in the top panel of Table (2) :
3.2 The dynamic impact of a shock under alternative banksbehaviours
In this section we shall examine the di¤erent dynamic paths followed by the economy under
the two types of bank behaviour listed above. We show the impulse response functions
(IRFs) of our baseline model in the face of a negative rms bond value shock. Figures
(1) and (2) display selected IRFs to a 1% decrease in bondsvalue. The dynamics can be
12
Description Value
' Curvature of labour disutility 5
 discount factor 0.99
c capitalists risk aversion coe¤. 1
s savers risk aversion coe¤. 2
Bs Constraint on bond supply 0.5
 Taylor rule coe¢ cient 1.5
" Elasticity of substitution (goods) 6
 Index of price rigidities 0.75
 Inverse of leverage ratio 0.09
 Saversshare 0.9
 Separation rate 0.08
B Level of hiring cost 0.12
 elasticity of productivity 0.02
z persistency of productivity 0.99
Table 2: Baseline Calibration
described as follows. In particular, Figure (1) shows that, if (31) holds, a decrease of bonds
real value generates an equivalent decrease of loans real value. If banks follow a passive
leverage behaviour, loans decrease on impact proportionally to the decrease in bondsreal
value. Deposits are kept constant and the shock does not a¤ect the policy rate and the
spread. As a consequence, under passive leverage real variables are not a¤ected: output
and employment stay constant at their steady state level, whilst no distributive e¤ect is
at work. Thus passive leverage is stabilising.
If deposits can vary, and leverage is kept constant by banks, a decrease in asset real
value will be absorbed both by a decrease in bank equity real value and by a decrease in
deposits. The latter will be the cause of a policy rate decrease, and a consequent widening
of the spread, reinforced by a shortage of loans. Notice that a shortage of loans alone
wouldnt be enough to a¤ect the spread substantially. Figure (2) underlines the real and
redistributive e¤ects of the shock when banks have either constant or procyclical leverage9.
It can be seen that the spread increase has recessionary e¤ects on economic activity. And
if, on impact, there is a redistributive10 e¤ect from capitalists to savers - the loss of income
for savers is smaller than that for capitalists - after few periods the redistributive e¤ect
is reversed, because an increase in rmsprots favours capitalists which increase their
consumption, di¤erently from savers who do not benet from increased prots.
The pro-cyclical behaviour of banks denitely reinforces the impact of a shock to the
real value of bonds and, as for macroeconomic real variables the impact is prolonged. On
impact, leverage is free to move, and it favours an increase in deposits. But, as soon
as the procyclical behaviour starts to bite, deposits decrease to guarantee an increase of
9Passive leverage, as already said, has no dynamic real e¤ect.
10We approximate redistribution through the ratio between investors/capitalists consumption and savers
consumption.
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Figure 1: Baseline Model: Banking Variables
bank equity. This has a strong downward pressure on the policy rate and a persistent
upward pressure on the spread. Hence, the bank procyclical behaviour strengthens both
the recessionary and the redistributive e¤ects of the shock that we have explained before,
as the green line in Figure (2) shows.
3.3 The interaction of procyclical leverage with hysteresis
The presence of hysteresis is likely to be central to the response of banking variables,
and above all real variables over the business cycle. In this section we want to explore
the interactions between hysteresis - due to complementarity between past employment
and resent TFP - and procyclical behaviour of banks as dened above. We compare our
baseline model with the same model in the presence of hysteresis. Chang et al. (2002)
assume a simple skill accumulation mechanism through learning by doing, in which the
skill level accumulates over time depending on past employment and that the skill level
raises the e¤ective unit of labour supplied by the household. We follow Tervala (2013) and
Engler, Tervala (2016) in assuming that the level of productivity accumulates over time
according to past employment, as follows:
zt = zzt 1 + Nt 1 (32)
where 0  z  1 and  are parameters (z = 0:99;  = 0:02). Equation (32) highlights
that a change in the current labour supply changes the level of productivity in the next
period, with an elasticity of :
Next we compare the dynamics of our baseline model with the dynamics of the model
with hysteresis, in response to a negative shock to the real value of bonds when the banks
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Figure 2: Baseline Model: Real Variables
leverage is procyclical.
Figures (3) and (4) display selected impulse responses (for banking and real variables
respectively) to a twenty percent decrease in bondsvalue. The presence of hysteresis does
not change the pattern of reactions after the shock. However, as expected, the combination
of hysteresis with banks leverage procyclicality denitely increase the persistence of a
nancial shock on output, employment and aggregate consumption, whilst the distribution
between capitalists and savers is permanentlymodied (it does not display convergence
over 40 periods).
4 Conclusion
In the present paper we have constructed a NK model with two types of agents and
non-maximising banks, in order to explore the macroeconomic dynamic e¤ects of di¤erent
attitudes towards leverage. The model explored in this paper allow us to capture two
relevant features of contemporary economies: uctuations in employment and unemploy-
ment and distributional e¤ects ensuing from di¤erent patterns of banksbehaviour. The
DSGE straightjacket does not allow us to go all the way to explain boomsand crises
by means of a formal model. We are not able to mimic the sort of nancial instability
hypothesis advanced by Hyman Minsky (1992). Our economy displays dynamic stabil-
ity, i.e. it goes back to a steady state sometimes after a nancial shock. However shock
amplication and slower convergence is at work under leverage targeting and even more
under procyclical leverage.
Indeed we are able to show how the behaviour of nancial institutions and the mac-
roprudential policy (i) a¤ect the steady state of the economy and (ii) may amplify and
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prolong the impact of nancial shocks. We rst show that, by allowing a higher (lower)
leverage, the macroprudential regulator allows the economy to have higher (lower) output
and employment in a steady state. We then analyze the e¤ects of a shock to the real
value of rms bonds under di¤erent banks leverage behaviours. Remarkably, we nd
that banksprocyclical behaviour implies a higher and more persistent instability after
a nancial shock with respect to a constant leverage behaviour. On the other hand, a
passive leverage behaviour is shock absorbing: output, employment and the distribution
of consumption between capitalists and savers are not a¤ected by the shock to the real
value of banksassets. The procyclicality of banks behaviour tends to amplify the e¤ects
of the shock on real variables. A negative shock to the real value of bonds, despite an
initial short-lived distributive e¤ect from capitalists to savers, has a persistent and large
distributive e¤ect in the opposite direction - from savers to capitalists. Finally, we compare
a model characterized by constant productivity with the same model under hysteresis. We
show that, with hysteresis, the e¤ect of the shock on real variables is more persistent. It
must be noted that a constant leverage target such as it could be set by banks regula-
tion is not su¢ cient to prevent shock amplication and distributive e¤ects from taking
place, although less pronounced than in a situation in which banks leverage is allowed
to be pro-cyclical. This result points to the need of an anti-cyclical regulation of banks
leverage, somehow forcing a passive leverage behaviour, perhaps by means of a ne-tuned
macro-prudential regulation.
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A Technical appendix
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A.4 Equilibrium
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s
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t
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
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f
t
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
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b
t

  (1  )wtNc;t
If we consider:
Ct = Cs;t + (1  )Cc;t;
labor market clearing condition:
Nt = Ns;t + (1  )Nc;t;
and equity market clearing condition for rms:

fc;t = 

f
c;t 1 =
1
1  
and banks:

bc;t = 

b
c;t 1 =
1
1  
we obtain:
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s
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t
dss;t 1    ft    bt   wtNt = 0
If we substitute (18) and (22), we obtain:
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s
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2
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Simplifying,
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2
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And considering that:
dss;t = Dt
Ldt = L
s
t
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s
t
Yt = Ct + gtHt +

2
(t   1)2
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